斯坦福邀请赛 LD 2024年1/2月辩题解析|2024 Stanford Invitational
Lincoln Douglas
即将于2024年2月10日至2月12日(PST太平洋标准时间)举行的斯坦福线上邀请赛中,SDcamps将带领中国学生参加LD赛制的辩论。斯坦福邀请赛LD辩论将使用NSDA 2024年1/2月辩题,即:
Resolved: The United States ought to substantially reduce its military presence in the West Asia-North Africa region.
今天我们将着重分析辩题中的关键词“reduce”、“substantially”和“military presence”的含义,让学生对这个辩题形成初步了解,为后续的辩题深度分析打下基础。
“reduce”不仅包括数量的减少,也可以指彻底消除。“substantially”的定义根据不同的法律文件和军事背景,有20%、25%、50%等不同的标准。
Reduce – No amount
Reduce requires a quantitative reduction
Wisconsin DNR 8, Wisconsin Dept of Natural Resources, http://www.dnr.state.wi.us/org/caer/ce/eek/earth/recycle/rgloss.htm
reduce: to lessen in amount, number or other quantity.
Reduce means to diminish in size
Guy 91 – Circuit Judge (TIM BOETTGER, BECKY BOETTGER, individually and as Next Friend for their Minor Daughter, AMANDA BOETTGER, Plaintiffs-Appellees, v. OTIS R. BOWEN, Secretary of Health and Human Services (89-1832); and C. PATRICK BABCOCK, Director, Michigan Department of Social Services (89-1831), Defendants-Appellants Nos. 89-1831, 89-1832 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT 923 F.2d 1183; 1991 U.S. App. LEXIS 671)
The district court concluded that the plain meaning of the statutory language does not apply to the termination of employment one obtains on his own. A termination, the court held, is not a refusal to accept employment.
In this case, the plain meaning of the various words suggests that “refuse to accept” is not the equivalent of “terminate” and “reduce.” As a matter of logic [**18] and common understanding, one cannot terminate or reduce something that one has not accepted. Acceptance is [*1189] a pre-condition to termination or reduction. Thus, a refusal to accept is a precursor to, not the equivalent of, a termination or a reduction. n3 n.3 This distinction is also reflected in the dictionary definitions of the words. “Accept” is defined in anticipatory terms that suggest a precondition (“to undertake the responsibility of”), whereas “terminate” and “reduce” are defined in conclusory terms (“to bring to end, . . . to discontinue”; “to diminish in size, amount, extent, or number.”). See Webster’s New Collegiate Dictionary (9th ed. 1985).
Reduce – Specific amount – 50%
Significant reduction is at least half – anything short is a confusing token gesture
Senator Tom Hayden 11, the Nation Institute’s Carey McWilliams Fellow, has played an active role in American politics and history for over three decades (Tom, The Nation, “Obama’s Decisions on Afghanistan, Iraq, Pakistan Will Determine Re-Election Chances”4/26,
http://www.thenation.com/article/160194/obamas-decisions-afghanistan-iraq-pakistan-will-determine-re-election-chances
On Afghanistan, Obama told the Associated Press last Friday that his coming July announcement of troop withdrawals would be “significant…not a token gesture.”
Though the president offered no specific numbers, the phrasing was an important signal, delivered in White House–speak. According to Bob Woodward’s book Obama’s Wars, the internal debate between the White House and Pentagon over Afghanistan has been intense. When the president announced in a December 2009 West Point speech that he was sending 30-33,000 more American troops in a military surge to Afghanistan, it appeared that the Pentagon and Secretary of State Hillary Clinton had won the argument. But Obama slipped a hedge into the West Point speech pledging that he would “begin the transfer of our forces out of Afghanistan in July 2011.”
What did it mean to “begin” a transfer? When would it end? Would it be based on conditions on the ground, as demanded by the military, or a firm deadline, which Obama expected would come from the Hill? Peace groups, opposed to Obama’s troop surge of 33,000, weren’t impressed by vague talk of simply beginning something that had no end. The cynicism deepened when Obama announced in November 2010 that American combat operations would end by 2014, and that counterterrorism capabilities would remain beyond that date.
Pentagon officials, including Secretary of Defense Robert Gates and Gen. David Petraeus, have publicly advocated the most minimal version of an initial withdrawal. In a recent speech to NATO recently, Gates chastised the Europeans for “too much talk about exit and not enough about continuing the fight.” He added that “we will not sacrifice the significant gains made to date, or the lives lost, for a political gesture.” Woodward’s book quoted Petraeus saying “I don’t think you win this war. I think you keep fighting.”
Obama’s concern was being dragged into an unpopular, unaffordable quagmire by generals with competing agendas. As Woodward quoted him, “I can’t lose all the Democratic Party.”
But that is what’s happened. Peace sentiment, expressed openly in the streets during the Bush years, became a silent but expanding presence inside the Democratic Party as Obama escalated the war. Recent polls indicate that a majority of Americans, including 86 percent of Democratic voters, favor speeding up the withdrawal of American troops.
In February, the Barbara Lee, the sole Congressional opponent of the open-ended authorization to go to war a decade ago, found herself in the mainstream of her party in opposing Afghanistan. Lee submitted a resolution to the Democratic National Committee calling on Obama to announce a “significant” and “substantial” withdrawal by July, a rapid pullout over the next two years and the transfer of the savings to job creation at home.
Since Obama is the leader of the DNC, all resolutions are vetted by the White House. At first, the Lee language was rejected by the staffers who monitor the doings of the party. Then something happened. White House objections disappeared. Centrist party leaders like Donna Brazille and Alice Germond signed on as co-authors of the Lee resolution, which passed without dissent.
Was the White House sending a signal that a strong peace statement from the party would be useful political cover? No one knows. Then came last week’s announcement by Obama echoing the DNC resolution’s call for a swift, sizeable and significant reduction.
So what would those terms mean in raw numbers? At the low end of “significant,” Obama could announce a withdrawal of 33,000 beginning in July and carrying through 2012, enabling him to claim he ended the surge he promised his military. That still would leave many Americans in confusion, wondering how a 2009 level of US combat would mean a step towards peace.
A more robust definition of “significant” would be a decrease of 32,000 troops by October of this year, followed by another decrease of 35,000 by July 2012, a reduction of more than half of America’s forces through the 2012 presidential campaign. These numbers are proposed by national security experts at the Washington, DC–based Afghanistan Study Group. The ASG estimates $60-80 billion in savings to American taxpayers per year.
DOD defines substantial reduction as 50% – official guidelines prove.
US Department of Defense (DOD), produced by the Office of Under Secretary of Defense (Acquisition, Technology, and Logistics),Office of Assistant Secretary of Defense (Command,Control, Communications, and Intelligence), Office of Director, Operational Test and Evaluation, “Mandatory Procedures for Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAPS) and Major Automated Information Systems (MAIS) Acquisition Programs,” April 5, 2002, http://www.explorationsystems.nasa.gov/documents/TTT_052005/DoD50002R.pdf DA 7/12/2010
C7.10.3.12. The DoD Components shall not terminate or substantially reduce participation in joint ACAT ID programs without Requirements Authority review and USD(AT&L) approval; or in joint ACAT IA programs without Requirements Authority review and ASD(C3I) approval. The USD(AT&L) or ASD(C3I) may require a DoD Component to continue some or all funding, as necessary, to sustain the joint program in an efficient manner, despite approving their request to terminate or reduce participation. Substantial reduction is defined as a funding or quantity decrease of 50 percent or more in the total funding or quantities in the latest President’s Budget for that portion of the joint program funded by the DoD Component seeking the termination or reduced participation.
Military legislation defines substantial reductions as 50%.
Comprehensive Base Closure Reform and Recovery Act of 1992 (102 H. R. 4421, Text of the full bill, introduced by Olympia Snowe, Lexis Congressional)
TITLE I-ENVIRONMENTAL RESTORATION AT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS TO BE CLOSED SEC. 101. CLEANUP SCHEDULE FOR CERTAIN BASES ON SUPERFUND NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST.
(a) CLEANUP SCHEDULE FOR CERTAIN BASES ON NATIONAL PRIORITIES LIST.-(1) With respect to each military installation described in subsection (b)-(A) before the installation is closed or substantial reductions in its operations have occurred, at least 75 percent of the remedial action required on the installation pursuant to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act of 1980 (42 U.S.C. 9601 et seq.) shall be completed; and (B) not later than two years after the installation is closed or substantial reductions in its operations have occurred, all of the remedial action required on the installation pursuant to such Act shall be completed.(2) For purposes of paragraph (1), substantial reductions in the operations of a military installation shall be considered to have occurred if more than 50 percent of the personnel assigned to the installation, including employees and members of the Armed Forces, have been reassigned and moved to another installation.
Reduce – Specific amount – 20%
“significant reduction” means at least 20% of total forces
FY 16 Defense Authorization Bill
June 3, 2015
[http://www.rpc.senate.gov/legislative-notices/s-1376_fy-16-defense-authorization-bill]
Expresses the sense of the Senate that the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan should be based on security conditions in Afghanistan and U.S. security interests in the region. It goes on to require the president to certify that any ordered significant reduction in U.S. forces in Afghanistan will result in an acceptable level of risk to U.S. national security objectives. A significant reduction is defined as the lesser of 1,000 or more troops or a 20 percent reduction of troops then deployed in Afghanistan.
A significant reduction in military presence has to be at least 1,000 troops or a 20% cut
[http://www.rpc.senate.gov/legislative-notices/s-1376_fy-16-defense-authorization-bill]
Expresses the sense of the Senate that the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan should be based on security conditions in Afghanistan and U.S. security interests in the region. It goes on to require the president to certify that any ordered significant reduction in U.S. forces in Afghanistan will result in an acceptable level of risk to U.S. national security objectives. A significant reduction is defined as the lesser of 1,000 or more troops or a 20 percent reduction of troops then deployed in Afghanistan.
the floor for significant is 20%–anything is meaningful—sets no limit on the topic.
Barasso 15 – Chair of the Senate Policy Committee
[Senator John Barasso, Senate Republican Policy Committee 15 – FY 16 Defense Authorization Bill, 6-3-15, http://www.rpc.senate.gov/legislative-notices/s-1376_fy-16-defense-authorization-bill]
Section 1221.
Expresses the sense of the Senate that the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan should be based on security conditions in Afghanistan and U.S. security interests in the region. It goes on to require the president to certify that any ordered significant reduction in U.S. forces in Afghanistan will result in an acceptable level of risk to U.S. national security objectives. A significant reduction is defined as the lesser of 1,000 or more troops or a 20 percent reduction of troops then deployed in Afghanistan.
Reduce – Specific amount – 25%
Military context proves substantially is 25% or more DoD 3
(“Operation of Defense Acquisition
System”,www.acq.osd.mil/dpap/Docs/DoDI50002signedMay1203.doc)
The DoD Components shall not terminate or substantially reduce participation in international cooperative ACAT ID programs under signed international agreements without USD(AT&L) approval; or in international cooperative ACAT IAM programs without ASD(C3I) approval. A DoD Component may not terminate or substantially reduce U.S. participation in an international cooperative program until after providing notification to the USD(AT&L) or the ASD(C3I). As a result of that notification, the USD(AT&L) or the ASD(C3I) may require the DoD Component to continue to provide some or all of the funding for that program in order to minimize the impact on the international cooperative program. Substantial reduction is defined as a funding or quantity decrease of 25 percent or more in the total funding or quantities in the latest President’s Budget for that portion of the international cooperative program funded by the DoD Component seeking the termination or reduced participation.
Substantial means a 25% reduction in troops AP 7
(http://www2.ljworld.com/news/2007/jul/23/commander_northern_iraq_proposes_troop_reduction/?more_like_this , Commander in northern Iraq proposes troop reduction
The Associated Press, July 23, 2007 , date accessed: 6/24/2010, AJK)
That, however, could mark the beginning of a phased move away from the heavy combat role that U.S. troops have played, at a cost of more than 3,600 U.S. deaths, for more than four years. That, in turn, could lead to the first substantial U.S. troop reductions beginning in the spring or summer – a far slower timetable than many in Congress are demanding. Mixon is not the only U.S. commander contemplating a repositioning or reduction of U.S. troops in the months ahead. Col. John Charlton, commander of the 1st Brigade, 3rd Infantry Division, who leads a task force of 6,000 U.S. soldiers in a section of Anbar province that includes Ramadi, said in an interview Friday that by January he might be ready to take a 25 percent troop cut if the Iraqi police, numbering about 6,000 now, are made stronger by then.
25% is the definition used in military legislation.
National Defense Authorization Act for Fiscal Year 1994, PUBLIC LAW 103-160 [H.R. 2401], NOVEMBER 30, 1993, Lexis Congressional
“(g) Definitions.–For purposes of this section:
“(1) The term ‘major defense program’ means a program that is carried out to produce or acquire a major system (as defined in section 2302(5) of title 10, United States Code).
“(2) The terms ‘substantial reduction’ and ‘substantially reduced’, with respect to a major defense program, mean a reduction of 25 percent or more in the total dollar value of contracts under the program.”.
Reduce – Specific amount – 1000 troops
A significant reduction in military presence has to be at least 1,000 troops or a 20% cut
[http://www.rpc.senate.gov/legislative-notices/s-1376_fy-16-defense-authorization-bill]
Expresses the sense of the Senate that the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan should be based on security conditions in Afghanistan and U.S. security interests in the region. It goes on to require the president to certify that any ordered significant reduction in U.S. forces in Afghanistan will result in an acceptable level of risk to U.S. national security objectives. A significant reduction is defined as the lesser of 1,000 or more troops or a 20 percent reduction of troops then deployed in Afghanistan.
USFG defines “significant reduction in US military forces” as 20% reduction in troops.
Senate Republican Policy Committee 6-3-15 on the FY 16 Defense Authorization Bill [http://www.rpc.senate.gov/legislative-notices/s-1376_fy-16-defense-authorization-bill]
Section 1221. Expresses the sense of the Senate that the drawdown of U.S. forces in Afghanistan should be based on security conditions in Afghanistan and U.S. security interests in the region. It goes on to require the president to certify that any ordered significant reduction in U.S. forces in Afghanistan will result in an acceptable level of risk to U.S. national security objectives. A significant reduction is defined as the lesser of 1,000 or more troops or a 20 percent reduction of troops then deployed in Afghanistan.
Reduce – Specific amount – not small
Small changes don’t change overall presence-destroys links to core negative arguments and makes the topic bidirectional
Military Times 1/9/15
EUCOM base closures will not affect force levels
http://www.militarytimes.com/story/military/pentagon/2015/01/08/eucom-base-closures-will-not-affect-force-levels/21453321/
The fight over the future of the U.S. military in Europe has faced powerful cross currents. Advocates for the “Pacific pivot” were eager to shift resources to the other side of the globe. As Congress pressured the Pentagon to cut costs across the board, budget hawks wanted to shutter more Cold War-era installations to save money. But after Russia invaded Ukraine, diplomatic pressure from NATO allies and others sought to do the opposite and ramp up the American military presence in U.S. European Command to counter the renewed Soviet-style aggression. The final decision: Not much will change. The Pentagon on Thursday unveiled the results of its two-year review of the U.S. military footprint in Europe, known as the European Consolidation Initiative, or ECI, and concluded there will be no major adjustment to the overall U.S. force level. The new plan calls for shifting some troops within EUCOM. The biggest change will affect the Air Force in England. Two new F-35 Lightning II Joint Strike Fighter squadrons will deploy to RAF Lakenheath by 2020, along with about 1,200 airmen. And the Air Force will close nearby RAF Mildenhall, now home to about 3,900 personnel, in 2019. The Air Force units from Mildenhall will move to Germany. Specifically, the KC-135 Stratotankers will transfer to Ramstein Air Base and the 352nd Special Operations Wing will move to Spangdahlem Air Base. AIR FORCE TIMES USAF to leave Mildenhall, 2 other English bases Meanwhile, the Army’s footprint in Europe, and remaining Cold War-era military bases in Germany and Italy, will be mostly unaffected by force structure changes. The size of EUCOM’s permanent American force will stay at about 67,000 for the next five years, officials said. That garrison force will be buttressed by additional “temporary” U.S. troops, as the Pentagon renews its commitment to the rotational deployment of hundreds of U.S. service members to Eastern Europe. Those rotations, involving mostly soldiers and airmen spread in small units across Poland and the Baltic states, began last year to reassure NATO allies growing anxious about Russian military aggression. “The intent is to continue this rotational presence into the future,” said Derek Chollet, assistant secretary of defense for international security affairs, at a Pentagon briefing Thursday. “As things change in Europe, things get better or perhaps things get worse, we may adjust accordingly,” Chollet said. EUCOM initially filled those rotations with its own forces assigned to Western Europe, but is requesting U.S.-based Army and Air Force units to provide additional support. Costs for the rotational forces and some new infrastructure investments in Eastern Europe will be covered by the $1 billion “European Reassurance Initiative” that Congress approved last year. The ERI is intended to bolster the 2015 budget and was specifically intended to address NATO concerns about Russian aggression. Its long-term funding is unclear. The EIC review also included more than 20 closures of small, under-used military facilities across Europe. For example, the American-run Amelia Earhart Hotel in Wiesbaden, Germany, will close and the Vicenza Health Center in Italy will be converted into an outpatient-only facility. A total of 15 properties, including Mildenhall, will be returned to host nations. Overall, the changes will save the Pentagon about $500 million a year, a small fraction of the total defense budget of more than $500 billion, officials said. Pentagon officials emphasized that the changes will not affect the military’s overall war-fighting capacity in Europe. “We are consolidating and reducing some existing support infrastructure in order to be more efficient, but we are not affecting our operational capability,” Chollet said, adding that the changes “do not diminish our ability to meet our commitments to allies and partners. In fact, these decisions will produce savings that will enable us to maintain a robust force presence in Europe.”
Reduce – Specific amount – “very large”
Significant implies quantitative change –means very large
MacMillan Dictionary 15
http://www.macmillandictionary.com/us/dictionary/american/significant
very large or noticeable I think we can save a significant amount of time. The increase in enrollment this year is significant. a significant portion of the population Synonyms and related words Large in size:large, big, high…
Reduce – not Transfer
Reduce precludes transfers
Kentucky Ct of Appeals 84 (Paducah v. Moore, 662 S.W.2d 491, Lexis—sex edited)
No one quarrels with the appellants’ argument that HN3 the city has the power to transfer or even discharge employees at will. The right to do so, however, is restricted by Statutes of the Commonwealth of Kentucky. The language of KRS 90.360(1) above is quite clear in prohibiting reduction in grade of a classified service employee of the City except for cause and after a hearing upon appropriate written charges. In interpreting identical language concerning prohibition against reduction in grade provided for in KRS 95.450(1), our former Court of Appeals stated in Schrichte vs. Bornhorn, Ky., 376 S.W.2d 683 (1964):∂ . . . we are of the opinion that the term ‘grade’ means rank, whereas it appears that the appellant interprets it more broadly as job classification. Obviously by the use of the word ‘reduce,’ the Statute envisages a verticle scale. If a [person] is transferred without a loss in pay from one job category to another with comparable authority, his classification is changed, but his grade is not reduced.
Reduce – Permanent
Requires permanent reduction
Reynolds 59 – Judge (In the Matter of Doris A. Montesani, Petitioner, v. Arthur Levitt, as Comptroller of the State of New York, et al., Respondents [NO NUMBER IN ORIGINAL] Supreme Court of New York, Appellate Division, Third Department 9 A.D.2d 51; 189 N.Y.S.2d 695; 1959 N.Y. App. Div. LEXIS 7391 August 13, 1959, lexis)
Section 83’s counterpart with regard to nondisability pensioners, section 84, prescribes a reduction only if the pensioner should again take a public job. The disability pensioner is penalized if he takes any type of employment. The reason for the difference, of course, is that in one case the only reason pension benefits are available is because the pensioner is considered incapable of gainful employment, while in the other he has fully completed his “tour” and is considered as having earned his reward with almost no strings attached. It would be manifestly unfair to the ordinary retiree to accord the disability retiree the benefits of the System to which they both belong when the latter is otherwise capable of earning a living and had not fulfilled his service obligation. If it were to be held that withholdings under section 83 were payable whenever the pensioner died or stopped his other employment the whole purpose of the provision would be defeated, i.e., the System might just as well have continued payments during the other employment since it must later pay it anyway. [***13] The section says “reduced”, does not say that monthly payments shall be temporarily suspended; it says that the pension itself shall be reduced. The plain dictionary meaning of the word is to diminish, lower or degrade. The word “reduce” seems adequately to indicate permanency.
Reduce – Eliminate
Reduce includes elimination
US Code, 09 (26 CFR 54.4980F-1, lexis)
§ 54.4980F-1 Notice requirements for certain pension plan amendments significantly reducing the rate of future benefit accrual.
(c) Elimination or cessation of benefits. For purposes of this section, the terms reduce or reduction include eliminate or cease or elimination or cessation.
Reduce can include an elimination
Federal Register, 10 (26 CFR 1.411(d)-3, Current as of 5/19/10, lexis)
(7) Eliminate; elimination; reduce; reduction. The terms eliminate or elimination when used in connection with a section 411(d)(6)(B) [26 USCS § 411(d)(6)(B)] protected benefit mean to eliminate or the elimination of an optional form of benefit or an early retirement benefit and to reduce or a reduction in a retirement-type subsidy. The terms reduce or reduction when used in connection with a retirement-type subsidy mean to reduce or a reduction in the amount of the subsidy. For purposes of this section, an elimination includes a reduction and a reduction includes an elimination.
Reduce – not Eliminate
Reduce does not mean to eliminate – judicial rulings prove
Marcus Perrin Knowlton, Late Chief Justice Of The Supreme Judicial Court Of Massachusetts, Opinion in Dora Green v. Abraham Sklar, June 20, 1905, Lexis Academic
The first question is whether, in applying the statute, the judge may consider the costs of the different cases together as one aggregate, and reduce them to an amount “not less than the [*364] ordinary witness fees and other costs recoverable in one of the cases”; or, whether he is to consider the costs of each case by itself, and make the reduction in each case separately. If he is limited to the latter mode, he cannot extinguish or disallow the costs altogether in any case, for the word “reduce,” in its ordinary signification, does not mean to cancel, destroy or bring to naught, but to diminish, lower or bring to an inferior state. We think HN2Go to this Headnote in the case.the words above quoted indicate that, in reducing the costs, the amount in all the cases together is to be considered and reduced. This makes it possible for the judge, in his discretion, to reduce them in such a way as to leave nothing in some of the cases, providing he leaves in the aggregate an amount not [***3] less than the largest sum recoverable in any of the cases.
“military presence”指的是海外驻扎的部队和人员,包括永久驻扎的和轮换部署的。不仅包括基地,也包括临时部署的部队,是用军事人员数量来衡量的。
Permanent
Presence is limited to permanently based units and forces overseas
Carter, Department of the Army, 02 – Department of the Army Civilian, paper submitted for the Strategy Research Project at the US Army War College
(Robert, “CONSIDERATIONS FOR PLANNING OVERSEAS PRESENCE,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc AD=ADA404187&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)
For purposes of this paper, the use of the term “overseas presence” is intended to refer to those units and personnel that are permanently based overseas – or – in the case of some assets (e.g., naval forces) – are deployed to a particular region on a regular, rotational basis. (For example, U.S. forces currently fighting terrorism in Afghanistan would not be considered part of U.S. overseas presence by this definition. Any residual forces remaining after cessation of hostilities might be considered permanent presence.) Please note that the data presented in this section are somewhat dated. Cited numbers of personnel and units should be considered as approximations only. Nonetheless, the data are adequate for giving a reasonable sense of the magnitude and allocation of current assets abroad. To constrain the scope of this effort to a manageable level, and focus on areas considered most vital to U.S. interests, only the three key regions of Europe, Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East are addressed.
Temporary
Presence includes temporary deployments
Cliff et al, 1 – associate political scientist with RAND and currently is assigned to the Office of the Deputy Assistant Secretary of Defense for Strategy (Roger, QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, Ed: Michele Flournoy http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA430963&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)
3 Another method of categorizing overseas presence forces—one used in recent reports of the Secretary of Defense—is by their degree of permanence. In this construct, overseas presence forces can be categorized as (1) permanently stationed, (2) rotationally deployed, and (3) deployed temporarily for exercises, combined training, or military-to-military interactions. See Secretary of Defense William S. Cohen, Annual Report to the President and Congress 2000, 4.
Forces / Personnel / Troops
Presence is measured by the number of military personnel in a region
Poon et al ‘06 [Jessie Poon (Department of Geography, University at Buffalo-SUNY, Buffalo) “The role of US defense exports in Asia Pacific regionalism,” Political Geography 25 (2006) 715-734, Science Direct]
The major source of defense trade data comes from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) where 1989 forms the earliest year that the data are available and 2004 the most recent (http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/user_set.asp). From this database, current and historical records may be searched for U.S. exports to Asia Pacific countries with the end use category ‘‘defense.’’ This ensured that dual use products were excluded from the search. Seven sectors may be identified for defense trade including military aircrafts, aircraft launching gear/parachutes, etc., engines/turbines for military aircraft, military trucks/armored vehicles, etc., military ships/boats,
tanks/artillery/ missiles/rockets/guns/ammunition, and parts/special goods, etc. Not all of the sectors will be analyzed because many countries contain only very sparse data. Approximately thirty Asia Pacific countries are identified to be engaged in defense trade with the US although this number varies from sector to sector. The countries include all members of APEC and the ARF but also extend to other countries that have been excluded from these arrangements such as Nepal, Bhutan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Oceania. Defense exports are supplemented by two other sources of data, that is, US military presence and countries’ military expenditure. US military presence is measured by the number and shares of active military personnel in the region.
This information is compiled by the US DepartmentofDefense
(http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/military/miltop.htm). Statistics on military expenditures may be obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (www.sipri. org). In addition, contextual information is also collected from research monographs on US military strategies. These reports are compiled by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in Washington, D.C., and CRS constitutes the public policy research arm of the US Congress. Many of these reports include testimonials to the Congress regarding defense and strategic events in the Asia Pacific, and provide important documentation as well as evidence of US geopolitical interests, policies and developments in the region.
Military presence refers to the number of military personnel in the region
Jessie P.H. Poon 6, Professor in the Department of Geography, University at Buffalo-SUNY, Suksawat Sajarattanachote, and Sharmistha Bagchi-Sen, “The role of US defense exports in Asia Pacific regionalism,”
Political Geography Volume 25, Issue 7, September 2006, Pages 715–734, http://www.sciencedirect.com/science/article/pii/S0962629806000825
The major source of defense trade data comes from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) where 1989 forms the earliest year that the data are available and 2004 the most recent
(http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/user_set.asp). From this database, current and historical records may be searched for U.S. exports to Asia Pacific countries with the end use category “defense.” This ensured that dual use products were excluded from the search. Seven sectors may be identified for defense trade including military aircrafts, aircraft launching gear/parachutes, etc., engines/turbines for military aircraft, military trucks/armored vehicles, etc., military ships/boats,
tanks/artillery/ missiles/rockets/guns/ammunition, and parts/special goods, etc. Not all of the sectors will be analyzed because many countries contain only very sparse data. Approximately thirty Asia Pacific countries are identified to be engaged in defense trade with the US although this number varies from sector to sector. The countries include all members of APEC and the ARF but also extend to other countries that have been excluded from these arrangements such as Nepal, Bhutan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Oceania. Defense exports are supplemented by two other sources of data, that is, US military presence and countries’ military expenditure. US military presence is measured by the number and shares of active military personnel in the region.
This information is compiled by the US DepartmentofDefense
(http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/military/miltop.htm). Statistics on military expenditures may be obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (www.sipri.org). In addition, contextual information is also collected from research monographs on US military strategies. These reports are compiled by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in Washington, D.C., and CRS constitutes the public policy research arm of the US Congress. Many of these reports include testimonials to the Congress regarding defense and strategic events in the Asia Pacific, and provide important documentation as well as evidence of US geopolitical interests, policies and developments in the region.
Military presence is limited to active military personnel
Jessie PH Poon, et al, Professor in the Department of Geography, University at Buffalo-SUNY, September 2006, Political Geography, ScienceDirect
The major source of defense trade data comes from the United States International Trade Commission (USITC) where 1989 forms the earliest year that the data are available and 2004 the most recent
(http://dataweb.usitc.gov/scripts/user_set.asp).
From this database, current and historical records may be searched for U.S. exports to Asia Pacific countries with the end use category ‘‘defense.’’ This ensured that dual use products were excluded from the search. Seven sectors may be identified for defense trade including military aircrafts, aircraft launching gear/parachutes, etc., engines/turbines for military aircraft, military trucks/armored vehicles, etc., military ships/boats,
tanks/artillery/ missiles/rockets/guns/ammunition, and parts/special goods, etc. Not all of the sectors will be analyzed because many countries contain only very sparse data. Approximately thirty Asia Pacific countries are identified to be engaged in defense trade with the US although this number varies from sector to sector. The countries include all members of APEC and the ARF but also extend to other countries that have been excluded from these arrangements such as Nepal, Bhutan, Mongolia, Pakistan, Bangladesh and Oceania. Defense exports are supplemented by two other sources of data, that is, US military presence and countries’ military expenditure. US military presence is measured by the number and shares of active military personnel in the region.
This information is compiled by the US DepartmentofDefense
(http://www.dior.whs.mil/mmid/military/miltop.htm).
Statistics on military expenditures may be obtained from the Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (www.sipri. org). In addition, contextual information is also collected from research monographs on US military strategies. These reports are compiled by the Congressional Research Service (CRS) in Washington, D.C., and CRS constitutes the public policy research arm of the US Congress. Many of these reports include testimonials to the Congress regarding defense and strategic events in the Asia Pacific, and provide important documentation as well as evidence of US geopolitical interests, policies and developments in the region.
Military presence is only troops – NOT missions
Kugler 98 – senior consultant at the Center for Technology and National Security Policy (CTNSP) of the National Defense University [Richard,
“Future Directions for the U.S. Overseas Military Presence”,
http://www.rand.org/pubs/monograph_reports/MR956/MR956.2.pdf]
Overseas presence is a policy instrument: a means to an end, not an end in itself. The United States deploys military forces abroad for specific purposes, and the posture, ideally, should reflect these purposes. One purpose is to perform the important but narrow mission of waging war and otherwise carrying out combat operations on short notice. An equally important purpose, however, is political and strategic. Overseas-presence forces are intended to work with the forces of friendly and allied countries, as well as with U.S. forces based in CONUS, to influence the behavior of many countries and therefore to help shape the international environment. Both purposes must be kept in mind when judging the performance of the current posture and future requirements. A legitimate question can be raised about whether the term overseas presence is the best name for this endeavor. During the Cold War, the relevant term was forward defense. This term was discarded when the Cold War ended, and it was replaced first by forward presence, then by overseas presence. One effect has been to strip away provocative connotations; an additional effect has been to create a term that seems devoid of purpose or activity. The term overseas presence merely states that U.S. forces are deployed overseas, but it says nothing about their ends and means. Perhaps a better term might be overseas security engagement or overseas security commitments, terms that convey a sense of strategic purpose, rather than presence for its own sake. For convenience I use overseas presence. However, I provide a comprehensive definition of this term because it includes so many things: Overseas presence is the set of U.S. military assets and activities abroad that, as a complement to power projection from CONUS, engages in purposeful security commitments and management efforts on behalf of a broad spectrum of national objectives that are “strategic”—that is, political, economic, and military in nature.
Presence means people in a topic country
Dictionary Of Military Terms, 3rd Ed. 2004, 187.
Presence: The fact of having people or units which represent a particular country or organization within a particular area.
Military Presence is troops
Flournoy & Tangredi 01 – a. Snr Advisor for Int’l Securty at CSIS, Research Prof at the Institute for National Strategic Studies at the National Defense U., & b. Captain, Senior Military Fellow at INSS @ NDU – served the Joint Staff of the Secretary of the Navy
[Michèle A. Flournoy and Sam J. Tangredi, Defense Strategy Alternatives: Choosing Where to Place Emphasis and Where to Accept Risk, from QDR 2001: Strategy-Driven Choices for America’s Security, Ed: Michele Flournoy
http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDoc?AD=ADA430963&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf]
6. Terms such as presence and engagement are often used rather loosely. Following a survey and analysis of existing sources, we developed or adopted specific definitions for the terms used to describe these strategy issues. We define overseas presence as military forces permanently stationed or rotationally or intermittently deployed overseas for the purposes of influence, engagement, reassurance, deterrence, and initial crisis response. We define peacetime military engagement as encompassing all U.S. military activities designed to enhance constructive security relations and promote broad U.S. security interests, including activities such as combined training and education, military-to-military interactions, security assistance, and various other programs. U.S. overseas presence forces are often also involved in conducting peacetime military engagement activities.
A) Department of the Army
Carter, Department of the Army, 02 – Department of the Army Civilian, paper submitted for the Strategy Research Project at the US Army War College
(Robert, “CONSIDERATIONS FOR PLANNING OVERSEAS PRESENCE,” http://www.dtic.mil/cgi-bin/GetTRDocAD=ADA404187&Location=U2&doc=GetTRDoc.pdf)
For purposes of this paper, the use of the term “overseas presence” is intended to refer to those units and personnel that are permanently based overseas – or – in the case of some assets (e.g., naval forces) – are deployed to a particular region on a regular, rotational basis. (For example, U.S. forces currently fighting terrorism in Afghanistan would not be considered part of U.S. overseas presence by this definition. Any residual forces remaining after cessation of hostilities might be considered permanent presence.) Please note that the data presented in this section are somewhat dated. Cited numbers of personnel and units should be considered as approximations only. Nonetheless, the data are adequate for giving a reasonable sense of the magnitude and allocation of current assets abroad. To constrain the scope of this effort to a manageable level, and focus on areas considered most vital to U.S. interests, only the three key regions of Europe, Asia-Pacific, and the Middle East are addressed.
“Presence” is only forces
DOD, 15 – DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms,
6/15,http://www.dtic.mil/doctrine/dod_dictionary/index.html?zoom_query=base&zoom_sort=0&zoom_per_page=10&zoom_and=1
Forward Presence- (DOD) Maintaining forward-deployed or stationed forces overseas to demonstrate national resolve, strengthen alliances, dissuade potential adversaries, and enhance the ability to respond quickly to contingencies.
Bases
Military presence means bases overseas
(scott note: I’m including this card because I think teams will read it from backfiles and it was in the TDI T file, but I can’t find this card on the internet – I think this is not a published article, but rather a personal email that Zane Waxman (an early 2010s Brophy debater) sent Layne prior to the 2010-2011 HS policy military presence and I believe that this was part of the reply, but I can’t even this find this specific correspondence in the way back machine)
Layne 10 – Professor and Robert M. Gates Chair in Intelligence and National Security at the George Bush School of Government and Public Service
(Christopher, “Definition of Military presence” May 12th, http://abnormalmeans.com/2010/05/definition-of-military-presence/)
My interpretation would be that “military presence” means bases with combat forces (or bases that normally are maintained by skeleton units but are maintained to receive combat forces crisis/surge type circumstances). I do not think in the normal meaning of the term that the US has military bases in N. Korea.
Military presence includes installations and large military formations-their interpretation conflates presence with all things military.
Harkavy-professor political science at Penn State-89 (Robert E., Professor of Political Science at Pennsilvania State University, “Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence, Oxford University Press, 1989, p7-8 Google Books
II. Definitions There is a certain amount of semantic confusion involving a number of terms and concepts now used to envelope the subject which, by common convention, long fell under the heading of ‘basing’ or ‘overseas bases’. Indeed, book titles earlier sported these terms without any self-consciousness about definitional ambiguity. As is so often the case, what is involved is not merely a matter of alternative or optional scholarly usage, but some subtle political and ideological issues as well. At issue arc such matters as degrees and types of foreign access, the political or economic terms of such access, and the extent to which it (access) is temporary or permanent. On the narrowest basis, one frequently (and interchangeably) sees the terms ‘base’, ‘facility’ and “installation’.” The last-named usually takes on the char- acter of a strictly technical term, devoid of political/ideological content—it refers usually to one finite physical operation with one function. The terms base and/or facility appear to be a bit broader in scope; although they are often used interchangeably they have come to connote very separate sets of circumstances. ‘Base’—a much more frequently used term for centuries up to the recent past- has come to define a situation in which the user nation (i.e., the foreign presence) has unrestricted access and freedom to operate. ‘Facility’, meanwhile, has come to be the preferred term where the host nation exerts ultimate sovereignty and where the user nation’s access is contingent, restricted and subject to ad hoc decisions about use in given situations. By these definitions, European access to installations in former colonial holdings would have defined a base; so too those situations of highly unequal power and leverage involving sovereign states where ‘status of forces agreements’ had given more or less open-ended access and use to the foreign presence, as was so often the case for US basing access earlier on in the post-war period. But then, as most of what used to be called basing now really refers to the above definition of facility, it is now often claimed that in an era of lapsed colonialism and diffused global sovereignty there are virtually no more bases, only facilities. That is formally or nominally true, but most writers continue to use the former term, if only after a formal demurrer regarding definitions. One might prefer the use of a still broader term, ‘foreign military presence’.” Everything that falls under the headings of bases and facilities would thereby be included. So too would large military formations (combat units, etc.) and military advisory groups, and headquarters operations which may be spread around office buildings in the centre of a host city. Still broader, however, is the notion of military access (sometimes co- terminously referred to as ‘strategic access’ but intended to connote a broader purview than would apply merely to strategic nuclear forces).” This concept subsumes not only permanent or durable basing facilities, but also such disparate activities as naval ship port visits, regular or occasional access for fishing fleets or occanographic vessels (some with ‘grey area’ military purposes), over-head use of airspace (aircraft overflights), ad hoc military aircraft staging (some- times involving use of commercial airports). HUMINT activities, whether fully clandestine or not, smaller military advisory groups, and so on. Clearly, the dividing line between this concept and those previously discussed is often in- distinct, involving blurred, grey areas. For instance, more than occasional use of a port for warship visits can come, at some point, to define a facility, though a formal definition of the latter might require permanent stationing on land of shore personnel engaged in maintenance, repair, reprovisioning, and so on. Similarly, frequent and more or less regular use of access to airports becomes, at some point, a ‘staging base*, or rather, a commercial ‘staging facility*.
MP = bases and facilities, NOT arms transfers, development aid, offsets, base rentals-bargaining distinction
Harkavy 89 (Robert E., Professor of Political Science at Pennsilvania State University, “Bases Abroad: The Global Foreign Military Presence, Oxford University Press, 1989, p270
22. See Harkavy, Bases Abroad, 320-72. For Harkavy, the types of foreign Military presence include large air, naval, and army bases, C4ISR installations, and technical facilities. Objects of bargaining include arms transfers, security assistance, overseas development assistance (ODA), base rentals, and offsets.
Military presence should be defined as US bases
Meernik-prof political science UNT-94
Dr. James Meernik is Professor of Political Science at the University of North Texas and Associate Editor of International Studies Quarterly. He is also Chair of the Department of Political Science. Dr. Meernik specializes in research on U.S. foreign policy and international criminal tribunals. His research has been published in International Studies Quarterly, the Journal of Politics, Political Research Quarterly, Journal of Peace Research, Conflict Management and Peace Science, Journal of Conflict Resolution, International Criminal Law Review, and the American Journal of Political Science. He is also author of The Political Use of Foreign Military in U.S. Foreign Policy (Ashgate Press) and co-editor of Conflict Prevention and Peace Building in Post War Societies, with Professor T. David Mason (Routledge Press). Dr. Meernik received his Ph.D. in Political Science from Michigan State University in 1992. Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force Author(s): James Meernik Source: International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 38, No. 1 (Mar., 1994), pp. 121-138 Published by: Blackwell Publishing on behalf of The International Studies Association Stable URL: http://www.jstor.org/stable/2600874
Nations possess a multitude of means by which they may protect their security and demonstrate their national interests to other states, such as forming alli- ances, spending money on armaments, and going to war. If we are to determine exactly where national interests lie, however, it is to visible demonstrations of commitment and concern for particular states and regions that we must look. The level of American military involvement in the area in which an opportunity takes place is perhaps the most visible demonstration of U.S. commitment. U.S. military involvement as defined includes: (1) an established American military presence, defined as a U.S. military base, (2) the furnishing of military aid to some state or organization, or (3) a prior use of force.
Bases are the most crucial component of military commitment
James Meernik, University of North Texas, 1994, “Presidential Decision Making and the Political Use of Military Force,” International Studies Quarterly, Volume 38, p. 128
American Military Presence. The first, and perhaps most important indicator of U.S. involvement, is the establishment of a permanent American military base. Not only does such a military presence signify an especially close relation- ship between the host country and the United States, it also demonstrates that the United States is necessarily involved should any aggression against the host country take place. This trip-wire function ensures that U.S. credibility and interests are always and obviously at stake in any matters that threaten the stability of the host country or the U.S. presence. Military bases are defined to include all permanent U.S. facilities that are home to army, navy, or air force combat-oriented units according to either the Department of Defense Annual Reports (various years) or Harkavy (1989). This leads to the following proposition: H1: Situations occurring where there is an established U.S. military presence increase the level of the military response.
其他赛事正在报名中
哈佛国际辩论锦标赛(12月16-17)正在报名中:
正在报名|哈佛国际辩论锦标赛「Harvard Debate Council Intl Tournaments Dec 2023」
Resolved: The United States federal government should forgive all federal student loan debt.
11/12月份美国赛事的PF辩论使用相同的辩题,我们为参赛的同学准备了专门的备赛辅导及资料,助力大家藤校摘星;秋季常规课程、WSC世界学者杯的耶鲁冠军轮备赛班也已同步开始:
2023秋季辩论/演讲课程|哈佛/耶鲁备赛及WSC耶鲁冠军轮备赛课程
美国藤校/亚太海外赛事时间表
哈佛国际辩论锦标赛:12月16-17
亚洲学校辩论赛:2024年1月20-21
哥伦比亚大学邀请赛:2024年1月26-28
亚洲青少年辩论锦标赛:2024年1月27-28
伯克利国际议会邀请赛:2024年2月3-4
宾夕法尼亚大学精英赛:2024年2月10-12
斯坦福大学邀请赛:2024年2月10-12
哈佛大学锦标赛:2024年2月17-19
TOC演讲与辩论赛:2024年2月24-26
注:
上述赛事所安排的时间,除报名系统中特别注明外所标时间均为主办方所在地区的当地时间。
高含金量的美国、英国及亚洲国际性赛事,等你来战!
赛事报名
首次报名选手请扫描下方二维码,注册后提交辩手(或辩论队)信息报名;参加过赛事的选手可直接报名。咨询微信:
课程及备赛报名
首次报名选手请扫描下方二维码,注册后提交辩手(或辩论队)信息报名;参加过赛事的选手可直接报名。咨询微信:
辩论课程及备赛教练简介:
3、SD美国教练天团|屡获殊荣的辩论教练的教练Dr.Nick
5、SD美国教练天团|美国精英家庭的私人辩论教练-Shane
6、SD美国教练天团|全能型的辩论教练和写作导师-Anthony
成长的足迹|部分辩手专访:
冠军访谈|哈佛双冠王:两次哈佛国际辩论锦赛冠军Catherine,“自信坦荡,光芒万丈!”
冠军访谈|塔夫茨&哈佛国际辩论赛/哈佛 Junior Extemp 双料冠军周子心
冠军访谈|Isabel:刷新第49届哈佛锦标赛十六强/西雅图大学中学生锦标赛冠军最小年龄组记录
蝴蝶效应——从普通公立校辩论小白到哈佛Harvard Junior WSD冠军
成长的快乐:Harvard Junior JED冠军、西雅图大学锦标赛季军的成长之路
系列赛事报名及回顾:
赛报:UCLA邀请赛公开组辩手Top1、四强|UCLA Speech & Debate Invitational
赛报:西雅图大学辩论锦标赛冠、亚军|Seattle University Debate Tournament
赛报:哈佛国际辩论秋季赛冠军「Harvard Debate Council International Tournaments」
赛报:全美议会辩论联盟秋季赛优秀辩手 Top3|NPDL Fall Invitational 2023
赛报:31届耶鲁邀请赛VPF八强|31st Yale Invitational Tournament Int’l Quarter
赛报:亚洲青少年辩论锦标赛季军|Asia Junior Championship Summer 2023
赛报:WSC厦门全球轮总分冠军|2023世界学者杯World Scholar’s Cup 厦门全球轮 晋级耶鲁冠军轮
赛报:印度-太平洋世界学校辩论锦标赛季军|Indo-Pacific WSDC 2023
赛报:亚洲学校辩论公开赛打入决赛|BP赛事「Asia Schools Open 2023」
赛报:亚洲青少年世界学校辩论锦标赛亚军|Junior WSDC 2023
赛报:亚太青少年/亚太辩论锦标赛季军、八强|Asia Pacific Junior Debating Championships
赛报:平均年龄最小的WSC辩论冠军|2023世界学者杯World Scholar’s Cup
赛报:包揽3个组别冠军|Seattle University PF Debate Tournament
赛报:“收割式”获奖WSC合肥赛|2023世界学者杯World Scholar’s Cup
赛报:刷新哈佛锦标赛16强最小年龄记录|49th Harvard、37th Stanford、Tufts Harvard
赛报:塔夫茨&哈佛国际辩论锦标赛冠军|Tufts Harvard Debate Intl Tournaments
赛报:哥伦比亚大学邀请赛JV PF组八强+优辩|2023 Columbia University Invitational
赛报:哈佛PF冠军赛公开组辩手TOP 1|Harvard Debate PF Championships
赛报:哈佛 Junior WSD 冠军|Harvard Asian Junior Debate Tournament
赛报|伦敦政治经济学院BP锦标赛 LSE Debate Juniors:季军,优秀辩手第6名、第7名
赛报:哈佛 Junior Extemp 冠军|Harvard Asian Junior Debate Tournament
赛报|乔治城大学秋季赛:Novice LD组冠军,HS Junior Varsity LD组第三!
赛报:包揽冠亚季军|西雅图大学锦标赛SDcamps继续“霸屏”!
赛事简报|乔治城秋季赛:2支中国队首次打入该项赛事的淘汰赛,1支打入16强!
创造历史!西雅图战报:中国选手打入决赛获得亚军/中国辩手排名进入前2、前4!
赛事安排,常规课程及备赛课程内容及具体安排请加下方SD小助手微信咨询:
课程及赛事咨询
SDcamps•演辩营课程及赛事咨询,请添加小助手微信: